FATF Shows How Financial Rules Can Shape Security Outcomes
Modern security is no longer protected only by soldiers, borders, intelligence agencies and weapons. It is also protected by accountants, banks, auditors, customs officers, regulators, compliance systems, beneficial ownership registers, suspicious transaction reports and international financial standards.
That is the quiet power of the Financial Action Task Force.
The FATF does not command an army. It does not impose military sanctions. It does not run prisons. It does not conduct raids. It does not try terrorists in court. Yet its decisions can influence how banks treat a country, how investors assess risk, how lenders price money, how governments rewrite laws, how regulators monitor transactions and how terror-financing networks are disrupted.
This is why FATF matters.
It shows that financial rules can shape security outcomes.
For much of history, terrorism and organised crime were treated mainly as policing problems. Catch the attacker. Arrest the smuggler. Seize the weapon. Break the network. But the modern world has shown that violence, crime and instability require money. Terrorist organisations need funds to recruit, travel, communicate, procure weapons, run propaganda, support families, move operatives and sustain local networks. Drug cartels, cybercriminals, corrupt officials, arms traffickers and proliferation networks also need access to the financial system.
Follow the money, and security becomes visible.
The FATF’s purpose is built around this insight. It identifies jurisdictions with weak measures against money laundering and terrorist financing and publicly lists them through two documents issued three times a year. Its “black list” covers high-risk jurisdictions subject to a call for action, while its “grey list” covers jurisdictions under increased monitoring that have committed to fixing strategic deficiencies.
This system has real effects. A country placed under FATF monitoring does not merely suffer diplomatic embarrassment. It faces higher scrutiny from global banks, greater investor caution, reputational damage, compliance pressure and sometimes more expensive access to international finance.
That is the power of financial governance.
A designation made in a plenary room can affect capital flows, banking relationships and national security behaviour.
FATF Is a Security Institution Disguised as a Financial Standard-Setter
The FATF was established in 1989 as an international watchdog against money laundering. After the September 11 attacks, its mandate expanded sharply to include terrorist financing. Later, proliferation financing also became central.
This evolution reflects a larger transformation in global security thinking.
In the twentieth century, illicit finance was often seen as a criminal justice issue. In the twenty-first century, it is a strategic issue. Dirty money does not only buy luxury houses and offshore accounts. It buys weapons, influence, disinformation, political capture, narcotics routes, cyber infrastructure and terrorist capacity.
A weak financial system becomes a security vulnerability.
The FATF’s own description of high-risk jurisdictions makes the logic clear: global safeguards against money laundering and terrorist financing are only as strong as the weakest jurisdiction, because criminals can exploit weak controls to launder money or move assets to finance terrorism through the financial system.
That statement contains the entire logic of financial security.
A country may have strong laws at home, but if money can pass through weaker jurisdictions, shell structures, informal channels, crypto platforms or poorly supervised banks elsewhere, the security threat survives. Terrorism and organised crime use the gaps between jurisdictions. FATF tries to close those gaps.
This is why it functions as a security institution even though it speaks the language of compliance.
The Grey List Works Through Pressure, Not Punishment Alone
The FATF grey list is often misunderstood.
Being grey-listed does not mean a country is declared criminal. It means FATF has identified strategic deficiencies in that country’s anti-money laundering, counter-terrorist financing and counter-proliferation financing system, and the country has committed to address those deficiencies within agreed timelines.
As of 13 February 2026, FATF’s jurisdictions under increased monitoring included Algeria, Angola, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Vietnam, the Virgin Islands (UK) and Yemen. FATF added Kuwait and Papua New Guinea at its February 2026 plenary.
The power of the grey list lies in reputational pressure.
Once a country is grey-listed, its government faces a strong incentive to reform. Banks ask tougher questions. Investors become cautious. International lenders watch more closely. Domestic regulators come under pressure. Politicians can no longer ignore deficiencies that were earlier treated as technical matters.
This is what makes FATF unusual.
It does not need to impose direct economic sanctions to create consequences. Public identification itself changes behaviour. The FATF says public warnings put pressure on identified jurisdictions to address deficiencies to maintain their position in the global economy, and that public identification encourages countries to make significant improvements.
In other words, FATF uses access to the global financial system as leverage.
That leverage is powerful because no modern economy can afford financial isolation.
The Black List Shows the Hard Edge of Financial Security
If the grey list is pressure, the black list is warning.
FATF’s high-risk jurisdictions subject to a call for action are treated as serious threats to the integrity of the international financial system. As of February 2026, the listed high-risk jurisdictions were the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran and Myanmar. FATF called for countermeasures for DPRK and Iran, and enhanced due diligence for Myanmar.
This matters because blacklisting directly affects how the world’s financial institutions treat transactions linked to those countries.
For DPRK, FATF has long expressed concern about money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing risks, especially linked to weapons of mass destruction financing. It has called for countermeasures such as terminating correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, closing subsidiaries or branches of DPRK banks and limiting business relationships with DPRK persons.
For Iran, FATF has repeatedly pointed to incomplete action-plan commitments and continuing terrorist-financing and proliferation-financing concerns. In February 2026, FATF noted Iran’s renewed engagement but still assessed that Iran had not completed most of its action plan and reiterated countermeasures.
For Myanmar, FATF called for enhanced due diligence and warned that if further progress was not made by June 2026, it would consider countermeasures.
This is the hard edge of financial governance.
When a country is seen as a serious illicit-finance risk, the global system does not need to invade it. It can restrict, monitor, isolate and de-risk financial channels. That is not a substitute for all security policy, but it is a powerful instrument.
Terrorism Cannot Operate Without Money
Terrorist violence is visible. Terrorist financing is quieter.
A bomb blast, shooting or hostage attack captures public attention. The financing behind it is less visible: small donations, hawala networks, cash couriers, fake charities, extortion, narcotics, gold smuggling, trade-based laundering, online crowdfunding, crypto transfers, front companies and sympathetic business networks.
Security agencies can stop individual attackers. But if the financial ecosystem remains intact, networks regenerate.
That is why counter-terrorist financing is central to modern security.
Terror financing is not only about large sums. Sometimes small amounts can create major violence. A low-cost attack may need only travel money, accommodation, phones, weapons, local support and propaganda material. This makes detection difficult. Banks and regulators cannot look only for huge suspicious transfers. They must detect patterns, networks, anomalies and relationships.
FATF standards push countries to build these systems: customer due diligence, suspicious transaction reporting, financial intelligence units, beneficial ownership transparency, targeted financial sanctions, non-profit sector risk assessment, cross-border cooperation and prosecution capacity.
These are not glamorous instruments. But they are essential.
A country that cannot trace money cannot fully fight terrorism.
Pakistan Shows FATF’s Strategic Importance for India
For India, FATF is not an abstract regulatory body. It is part of national security diplomacy.
Pakistan’s history with the FATF grey list became a major issue in India’s counter-terrorism strategy. Pakistan was removed from the FATF grey list in 2022, which improved its financial reputation and mattered for its crisis-hit economy. Reuters reported in May 2025 that India intended to push FATF to add Pakistan back to the grey list after a deadly Kashmir attack, while Pakistan denied involvement.
This episode shows how FATF can become part of geopolitical pressure.
India’s argument has long been that cross-border terrorism cannot be addressed only through military or diplomatic tools. It also requires financial scrutiny. If groups, charities, handlers, facilitators and support networks can access funds, violence can continue even under formal bans.
Pakistan’s case also shows why FATF matters beyond symbolism. Grey-listing can affect lender confidence, investor behaviour and economic reputation. For a country dependent on external financing, that pressure can be significant.
At the same time, FATF must remain evidence-based. If it becomes merely a geopolitical weapon, its credibility will weaken. The strength of FATF lies in standards, peer review and documented deficiencies. Its value for India and the world depends on its ability to distinguish security evidence from political accusation.
That balance is difficult but essential.
India’s Own FATF Evaluation Shows Strengths and Gaps
India’s FATF performance is also important.
In 2024, FATF said India had achieved a high level of technical compliance across its recommendations and had taken significant steps to tackle illicit finance. The joint FATF-APG-EAG assessment said India’s AML/CFT framework was achieving good results, including in risk understanding, access to beneficial ownership information and depriving criminals of assets.
That was a major positive outcome for India.
Reuters reported in June 2024 that FATF found India largely compliant with its rules and effective in curbing money laundering and terrorist financing, though it said India needed stronger supervision of some non-financial sectors and faster conclusion of money laundering and terror-financing prosecutions. India was placed in the “regular follow-up” category, meaning it had to report to FATF only in 2027.
This is significant for two reasons.
First, it strengthens India’s financial reputation. Good FATF ratings support investor confidence, improve perceptions of financial-system integrity and strengthen India’s credibility in global economic institutions.
Second, it shows that India still has work to do. FATF specifically noted that India should improve completion of money laundering and terrorist-financing trials and ensure appropriate sanctions. It also highlighted the need for a risk-based and educative approach with non-profit organisations.
This is the correct lens. India should welcome the positive evaluation but not treat it as final victory.
Financial security is not a one-time examination. It is a continuous system.
The Non-Profit Sector Dilemma
One of the most sensitive areas in FATF policy is the non-profit sector.
Terrorist organisations may misuse charities, relief bodies and non-profit channels to move funds. That is a real risk. But excessive regulation can also harm legitimate civil society, humanitarian relief, education, health work and community organisations.
This is a difficult balance.
If governments under-regulate the sector, terror financiers may exploit it. If governments over-regulate it, genuine civil society may be harassed, chilled or paralysed. The FATF has increasingly recognised this problem and warns against unintended consequences, including disruption of humanitarian assistance and legitimate non-profit activity.
In its February 2026 grey-list statement, FATF specifically said countries should ensure that funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate non-profit activity and remittances are neither disrupted nor discouraged.
That statement matters.
Security policy must not become a blunt instrument. A financial rule designed to stop terrorism should not end up starving disaster relief, medical aid or community development. Risk-based regulation is essential. The goal should be to identify abuse, not criminalise an entire sector.
India faces this challenge too. FATF’s India report recognised strong counter-terror financing efforts but also called for a risk-based and educative approach with non-profit organisations.
That is a mature recommendation. Security and civil society must not be treated as enemies. The right approach is targeted vigilance, transparency and proportionality.
Beneficial Ownership Is a Security Issue
One of FATF’s most important areas is beneficial ownership.
A company may have a legal owner on paper, but the real person controlling it may be hidden behind nominees, layered entities, offshore structures or trusts. Criminals, corrupt officials, sanctions evaders and terror financiers exploit this opacity.
Beneficial ownership transparency asks a simple question: who really owns or controls the money?
That question is central to security.
Shell companies can buy property, move money, hide bribes, finance networks and evade sanctions. Without beneficial ownership information, law enforcement agencies waste years chasing legal ghosts. Banks cannot properly assess risk. Courts struggle to connect assets to individuals.
FATF’s India assessment noted good results in access to beneficial ownership information. That is important because India’s economy is growing rapidly, corporate structures are becoming more complex and cross-border financial activity is expanding.
As India becomes a larger financial centre, beneficial ownership transparency will become even more critical.
Financial secrecy is not just a tax issue. It is a national security issue.
Digital Finance and Virtual Assets Create New Risks
The rise of digital finance has changed illicit finance.
Money can now move through crypto assets, online wallets, prepaid instruments, payment apps, gaming platforms, digital crowdfunding and decentralised finance channels. Some of these systems improve inclusion and efficiency. But they also create new opportunities for criminals.
Terrorist financiers may use small digital transfers. Cybercriminals may launder ransomware proceeds through crypto mixers. Sanctions evaders may use virtual assets to bypass traditional banking controls. Fraud networks may move money through mule accounts and online platforms.
FATF has recognised these evolving risks. Its February 2026 plenary approved new publications on cyber-enabled fraud and virtual assets, noting that these projects would help countries stay alert to evolving threats while harnessing technology responsibly.
This is crucial.
Financial security cannot remain stuck in the age of bank branches and paper documents. Regulators must understand blockchain analytics, virtual asset service providers, cross-border digital transfers, online fraud patterns and cybercrime-finance links.
At the same time, regulation must avoid killing innovation. India’s UPI revolution, fintech ecosystem and digital public infrastructure show that digital finance can expand inclusion massively. The challenge is to build safeguards without suffocating growth.
The future of FATF will increasingly be shaped by digital finance.
Trade-Based Money Laundering Is Hard to Detect
Another major challenge is trade-based money laundering.
Criminals can move value through fake invoices, over-invoicing, under-invoicing, multiple invoicing, misclassification of goods, phantom shipments and manipulation of commodity prices. This is difficult to detect because global trade is enormous and complex.
A shipment of textiles, electronics, chemicals, gold, machinery or agricultural goods may look legitimate. But the invoice may hide value transfer. A company may appear to be exporting goods while actually laundering money. Terror networks and organised crime groups can exploit weak customs systems, poor data integration and limited cooperation between tax, trade and financial authorities.
This is particularly relevant for countries like India, where trade volumes are large and informal or semi-formal business practices still exist in some sectors.
Fighting trade-based laundering requires customs intelligence, bank scrutiny, tax data, shipping records, corporate transparency and international cooperation. It cannot be done by financial intelligence units alone.
This is where FATF pushes states to think systemically.
Illicit finance is not one department’s problem. It is a whole-of-government problem.
FATF Makes Domestic Reform Internationally Compulsory
One of FATF’s strongest effects is that it converts domestic regulatory reform into an international obligation.
A country may delay anti-money laundering laws for years. It may ignore beneficial ownership transparency. It may underfund its financial intelligence unit. It may fail to supervise real estate, jewellery, casinos, accountants, lawyers or company service providers. It may have weak prosecution capacity. Normally, these would be domestic policy failures.
FATF changes that.
Once a country faces evaluation, those failures become international credibility issues. A poor rating can affect reputation, banking relationships and investor sentiment. This creates pressure on governments to act.
This is why FATF evaluations matter.
FATF mutual evaluations are peer reviews that assess both technical compliance and effectiveness. They do not merely ask whether a law exists. They ask whether the system works: Are criminals prosecuted? Are assets confiscated? Are suspicious transactions analysed? Are terrorist assets frozen? Are supervisors effective? Are sanctions dissuasive? Are beneficial owners identifiable?
This effectiveness focus is critical. Many countries can pass laws. Fewer can implement them.
Security outcomes depend on implementation.
The Cost of Grey-Listing Can Be Significant
Grey-listing can affect a country’s economy in several ways.
Banks may apply additional checks. Correspondent banking relationships may become harder. Foreign investors may hesitate. International lenders may demand more documentation. Transaction costs may rise. Businesses may face delays. The country’s image as a financial destination may suffer.
These effects vary by country. A large economy with strong institutions may manage the damage better than a small or fragile economy. But reputational consequences are real.
That is why countries work hard to exit the list.
FATF says that to be removed from monitoring, a jurisdiction must address all or nearly all components of its action plan, after which FATF organises an on-site visit to confirm implementation and political commitment.
This process is important because it prevents superficial compliance. A government cannot simply promise reform. It must demonstrate that reforms are underway and sustainable.
The lesson is clear: in a globalised financial system, regulatory weakness becomes expensive.
FATF Also Shapes Behaviour Before Listing
FATF’s influence is not limited to countries already listed.
Many countries reform because they fear being listed. This preventive effect may be even more powerful than the lists themselves.
Governments monitor their mutual evaluation timelines. Regulators prepare compliance upgrades. Banks strengthen due diligence. Legislatures pass amendments. Law enforcement agencies improve coordination. Financial intelligence units become more active. Beneficial ownership rules are tightened. Non-financial sectors come under supervision.
This is governance through anticipation.
The possibility of reputational damage creates incentives before formal punishment. In that sense, FATF operates like a global compliance discipline mechanism.
This may sound technical, but it has security consequences.
A country that improves its financial intelligence system before a crisis may detect terror financing earlier. A jurisdiction that improves beneficial ownership transparency may expose corruption networks sooner. A regulator that tightens virtual asset oversight may reduce cybercrime laundering.
Prevention is the best security outcome.
The Risk of Politicisation
FATF’s power also creates risks.
Because grey-listing and blacklisting have serious consequences, states may try to influence FATF processes for geopolitical purposes. Rivals may push for scrutiny. Allies may seek softer treatment. Powerful countries may have more diplomatic influence. Smaller countries may feel pressure unevenly.
This risk cannot be ignored.
If FATF becomes seen as a political weapon rather than a technical standard-setter, its legitimacy will suffer. Countries will treat evaluations as strategic pressure, not credible assessment. Compliance will become defensive rather than cooperative.
The solution is not to deny geopolitics. The solution is to strengthen transparency, consistency and evidence-based assessment.
FATF must apply standards equally. It must avoid selective pressure. It must keep evaluation methods credible. It must ensure that countries are judged on actual deficiencies and implementation, not merely political alignment.
This is especially important for India. India benefits from a strong FATF system when it is used to pressure terror-financing networks. But India also has an interest in FATF remaining credible, not politicised. A credible FATF is more useful than a captured FATF.
Financial Inclusion Must Not Be Sacrificed
Another concern is de-risking.
When banks face high compliance risk, they may cut off entire categories of customers, regions or sectors instead of managing risk properly. This can harm migrants, small businesses, charities, remittance channels and poorer communities. It can push money into informal channels, making monitoring harder.
FATF has explicitly stated that its standards do not envisage de-risking or cutting off entire classes of customers, but call for a risk-based approach.
This is important.
Bad compliance can weaken security. If legitimate customers are excluded from the formal financial system, they may turn to cash, hawala or informal routes. That reduces transparency. The goal should be smarter monitoring, not financial exclusion.
For developing countries, this balance is critical.
Financial inclusion is a development goal. Counter-terror financing is a security goal. They must reinforce each other, not collide. Digital identity, payment systems, transaction monitoring and risk-based regulation can help achieve both.
India’s experience with mass financial inclusion and digital payments gives it a chance to show how large-scale inclusion can coexist with financial security.
FATF and the Future of Proliferation Financing
FATF is not only about terrorism and money laundering. Proliferation financing is increasingly important.
Proliferation financing refers to the movement of funds or assets linked to weapons of mass destruction programmes. This includes networks that help sanctioned states procure technology, materials, components and financial services.
DPRK is the clearest example. FATF’s February 2026 statement repeated concerns about DPRK’s illicit activities linked to WMD proliferation financing and urged robust implementation of targeted financial sanctions.
This shows how financial rules connect directly to global security.
A missile programme does not need only engineers and materials. It needs procurement networks, front companies, shipping routes, payments, brokers and banks. If those channels are disrupted, proliferation becomes harder.
In a world of nuclear risk, drone proliferation, missile technology diffusion and dual-use components, proliferation financing will become even more important.
FATF’s role may therefore expand further into strategic security.
Why FATF Matters for the Global South
Some developing countries see FATF as another Western-dominated compliance regime. This concern is understandable.
AML/CFT compliance can be expensive. Poorer countries may lack capacity. Banks may overreact and reduce correspondent relationships. Humanitarian flows may suffer. Informal economies may be hard to regulate quickly. Small states may face reputational damage even when their actual global risk is limited.
FATF must take these concerns seriously.
But the Global South also benefits from strong financial integrity.
Illicit finance often hurts developing countries the most. Corruption drains public money. Drug trafficking destabilises communities. Illegal mining destroys ecosystems. Human trafficking exploits vulnerable populations. Terror financing kills citizens. Capital flight weakens development. Money laundering protects elites who steal from the state.
Financial transparency is not a Western agenda only. It is a development agenda.
The challenge is to make FATF implementation fair, capacity-sensitive and proportionate. Poor countries need technical assistance, not only criticism. Fragile states need support to build institutions. Humanitarian contexts need flexibility. But standards cannot be abandoned.
A world with weak financial controls is not fairer to the Global South. It is more dangerous for it.
India Can Use FATF Diplomacy More Strategically
India should treat FATF as a key pillar of its external security and economic diplomacy.
First, India should continue pushing for stronger global action against terrorist financing, especially cross-border networks, proxy groups and front organisations.
Second, India should strengthen domestic prosecutions. FATF’s India assessment clearly noted the need to conclude money laundering and terrorist-financing prosecutions and sanction offenders appropriately. Laws and investigations matter, but convictions create deterrence.
Third, India should improve supervision of designated non-financial businesses and professions. Real estate, precious metals, accountants, lawyers, company service providers and other gatekeepers can be exploited for laundering.
Fourth, India should lead on digital-finance regulation. With UPI, fintech growth and rising digital transactions, India can shape a Global South model of inclusive but secure digital finance.
Fifth, India should help smaller countries build AML/CFT capacity. Training, technology, FIU cooperation and regulatory assistance can become part of India’s development partnership.
Sixth, India should push for FATF standards that protect legitimate non-profit activity while targeting abuse.
This would allow India to combine national security, financial integrity and Global South leadership.
Financial Rules Are Now Instruments of Statecraft
The FATF story belongs to a larger trend: finance has become statecraft.
Sanctions, asset freezes, correspondent banking restrictions, anti-money laundering rules, beneficial ownership registers, SWIFT access, export controls, investment screening and crypto regulation are now part of strategic competition. States do not only fight through armies. They fight through financial access.
This creates both opportunity and danger.
The opportunity is that financial tools can disrupt terrorism, organised crime, corruption and proliferation without war. They can pressure states to reform. They can reduce impunity. They can make illicit networks more visible.
The danger is that financial tools can become overused, politicised or weaponised. If too many countries feel the global financial system is used selectively, they may seek alternatives. That could fragment the system and weaken cooperation.
FATF must therefore remain standards-based, not power-based.
Its legitimacy depends on being seen as a guardian of financial integrity, not an instrument of one bloc.
The Security State Needs Financial Intelligence
Traditional security agencies often focus on physical threats: borders, weapons, explosives, militant camps, communications and infiltration. But financial intelligence adds another layer.
It can reveal networks before violence occurs. It can expose relationships between charities, shell companies, handlers and operatives. It can show how funds move across borders. It can identify facilitators who never hold weapons but enable violence.
This is why financial intelligence units matter.
Suspicious transaction reports, bank data, tax information, customs records, corporate registries, telecom patterns and international cooperation can help build a picture of hidden networks. But this requires coordination. Financial intelligence is useful only when it reaches law enforcement, prosecutors and intelligence agencies in actionable form.
FATF evaluations push countries to improve this coordination.
That is where financial rules become security outcomes.
A better suspicious transaction system may prevent an attack. A stronger beneficial ownership registry may expose a terror front. A targeted asset freeze may disrupt recruitment. A prosecution may deter financiers.
Security is not only what happens after an attack. It is what prevents the money from reaching the attacker.
The Limits of FATF
FATF is powerful, but it is not magic.
It cannot eliminate terrorism. It cannot resolve geopolitical conflicts. It cannot force every state to act sincerely. It cannot fully regulate informal cash economies. It cannot stop all crypto abuse. It cannot prevent every corrupt official from hiding assets. It cannot ensure prosecution in countries with weak courts. It cannot remove political patronage from security policy.
Financial rules are necessary, not sufficient.
A terror network may survive through cash, local extortion or state support. Criminals may adapt faster than regulators. Governments may pass laws but fail to implement them. Banks may file defensive reports without meaningful analysis. Regulators may focus on paperwork instead of risk.
This is why FATF must keep emphasising effectiveness.
Compliance cannot become box-ticking. A country should not be praised merely for passing laws if criminals still move money easily. The real test is whether illicit finance is detected, disrupted, prosecuted and deterred.
The Real Lesson of FATF
FATF teaches a simple but profound lesson: the financial system is part of the security system.
A bank account can be a weapon.A shell company can be a shield.A charity can be misused as a channel.A crypto wallet can become a laundering route.A fake invoice can move value across borders.A weak regulator can become a security gap.A hidden beneficial owner can protect a criminal network.
This is the world FATF tries to regulate.
It does not do so perfectly. It faces politics, capacity gaps, technological disruption and concerns about fairness. But it has changed the behaviour of states. It has made financial integrity a national security requirement. It has shown that countries cannot participate in the global economy while ignoring the risks their financial systems create.
For India, FATF is especially important because terrorism, cross-border financing, digital finance, economic growth and global credibility all intersect. India’s strong 2024 evaluation was a positive sign, but the next stage requires faster prosecutions, stronger non-financial sector supervision, better digital-finance oversight and continued pressure on terror-financing networks.
For the world, FATF shows that security in the twenty-first century will not be secured only at checkpoints and borders. It will also be secured in compliance departments, courtrooms, registries, payment systems, customs databases and financial intelligence units.
The future battlefield is not only physical.
It is financial.
And FATF proves that when money is regulated seriously, violence, corruption and illicit power become harder to hide.
