The treaty is about trust, not only text
The pandemic treaty talks reveal the trust deficit between rich and poor nations because the argument is not only about legal clauses. It is about memory. During COVID-19, many developing countries watched vaccines, diagnostics, technology and financing move first toward wealthy states. They were asked to report outbreaks quickly, share data and cooperate globally, but they often received life-saving products late and on unequal terms. That experience now shapes every line of pandemic diplomacy.
The WHO Pandemic Agreement was adopted by the World Health Assembly on 20 May 2025 after more than three years of negotiations. That was a historic step, but the hard politics did not vanish. The key unresolved issue is the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing system, known as PABS. In plain language, the world still has to decide how countries should share dangerous pathogens and how the benefits - vaccines, diagnostics, treatments and knowledge - should be shared in return.
Why PABS matters
PABS is the heart of the trust problem. If a country detects a dangerous pathogen and shares samples or sequence data quickly, pharmaceutical companies and research centres may use that information to develop products. But what if the country that shared the pathogen cannot afford or access those products? What if technology remains concentrated in rich countries? What if benefit-sharing is voluntary, vague or delayed? In such a world, speed of reporting can look like surrender of bargaining power.
Rich countries and industry groups worry about rules that may weaken intellectual property, discourage innovation or create operational burdens during emergencies. Poorer countries worry that without binding equity provisions, the next pandemic will reproduce the injustice of the last one. Both concerns must be addressed, but they are not morally symmetrical. The country that lacks vaccines faces existential risk; the company that faces obligations faces commercial adjustment.
The COVID memory
The treaty talks cannot be understood without the memory of vaccine inequity. COVAX was created to widen access, but it struggled against export restrictions, bilateral deals and supply shortages. Rich countries secured doses early while many health workers in poorer countries waited. The language of global solidarity collided with the reality of national hoarding.
That memory created a political demand: never again should countries be asked to share outbreak information without guaranteed access to countermeasures. The pandemic agreement is therefore a test of whether the world can convert moral regret into enforceable cooperation.
Why rich countries hesitate
Rich countries argue that innovation requires incentives. Vaccine platforms, therapeutics, diagnostics and manufacturing capacity depend on private and public investment. They fear that rigid technology-transfer rules or benefit-sharing obligations could slow innovation or create legal uncertainty. They also face domestic political pressure to prioritise their own citizens during emergencies.
These arguments have practical weight, but they cannot be the final word. Public funding supported much pandemic innovation. Global pathogen sharing supports the entire research ecosystem. If benefits are privatised while risks are socialised, poorer countries will rationally distrust the system. A pandemic regime that protects innovation but fails equity will not be secure; it will be fragile.
Why poorer countries insist on equity
For poorer countries, equity is not charity. It is the condition for cooperation. Rapid reporting can damage tourism, trade and domestic politics. Sharing pathogen data can create diplomatic exposure. If the reward is delayed access to expensive products, governments may face pressure to withhold information or negotiate bilaterally. This is dangerous for everyone.
Equity also includes manufacturing geography. A world where vaccine production is concentrated in a few regions will repeat bottlenecks. Technology transfer, regional manufacturing hubs, transparent licensing and predictable financing are not ideological demands; they are preparedness tools.
India angle: bridge, manufacturer and negotiator
India has a central role because it is both a developing-country voice and a major pharmaceutical manufacturer. It understands the Global South's equity concerns, but it also has industry capabilities and regulatory responsibilities. This gives India a potential bridge role in pandemic diplomacy.
India should push for a practical bargain: fast pathogen sharing, pre-negotiated benefit commitments, affordable access, distributed manufacturing, transparent procurement and recognition of intellectual property without allowing it to block emergency access. India's credibility will depend on whether it can speak not only as a market and manufacturer but as a champion of equitable preparedness.
Global implications
If the pandemic agreement succeeds, it could become a model for cooperative security in a divided world. It would show that even amid geopolitical rivalry, states can build rules around shared vulnerability. If it fails or remains hollow, the next outbreak may begin in an atmosphere of suspicion, with countries slower to share data and faster to impose unilateral controls.
The stakes are larger than health. Pandemic cooperation affects trade, aviation, migration, education, debt, development and trust in multilateralism. A failed treaty would reinforce the belief that global rules protect the powerful first. A credible treaty would restore some faith in international institutions.
Counter-view: no treaty can guarantee solidarity
A serious counter-view says no treaty can force solidarity in a crisis. When citizens are dying, governments will prioritise national populations. Legal commitments may be ignored. Supply chains may break. Domestic politics may override global promises. Under this view, treaty optimism is naive.
The critique is sobering but not decisive. Treaties do not eliminate self-interest; they structure it. Pre-agreed rules, financing, manufacturing networks and benefit-sharing mechanisms can reduce panic. The alternative is not perfect sovereignty; it is chaotic competition.
What happens next
The next stage will revolve around the PABS annex and whether member states can agree on obligations that are specific enough to matter and flexible enough to operate during emergencies. Watch for disputes over product allocation, technology transfer, intellectual property, industry participation and financing.
What a fair bargain could look like
A workable bargain would require automatic access commitments. When companies use shared pathogen data to develop pandemic products, a defined share of production should be reserved for global allocation at affordable prices. Regional manufacturing should be activated early. Licensing terms should be negotiated before emergencies, not during panic. Financing should be predictable rather than dependent on charity drives.
The bargain must also protect speed. Bureaucratic benefit-sharing rules should not delay outbreak reporting. The system should make sharing the rational choice by guaranteeing that those who share are not punished economically or medically. Trust is created when cooperation produces visible returns.
Diplomatic fault lines
The fault lines are predictable: intellectual property, technology transfer, liability, product allocation, financing and industry participation. Rich countries want flexibility and voluntary arrangements. Poorer countries want obligations. Industry wants incentives and legal clarity. Civil society wants equity and transparency. The final text must satisfy enough of each group without becoming so vague that it changes nothing.
The negotiations also reflect wider geopolitical mistrust. US-China rivalry, North-South inequality, pharmaceutical lobbying and memories of vaccine nationalism all sit inside the treaty room. Pandemic diplomacy is health diplomacy, but it is also industrial policy and power politics.
India's strategic opportunity
India can help shape the middle path because it understands both access and production. It should not frame the debate as anti-industry. Instead, it should argue that industry legitimacy depends on access during emergencies. Affordable supply, licensing partnerships and distributed manufacturing can expand markets while strengthening trust.
India should also invest in its own preparedness so that its diplomatic voice is backed by capacity. A country that can detect outbreaks, share data responsibly and manufacture countermeasures at scale will be central to any future pandemic regime.
Editorial judgement
The pandemic treaty will matter only if it changes behaviour before fear returns. In every pandemic, time is the most valuable commodity. If countries lose time because they distrust the system, the legal achievement will be hollow.
The treaty talks are therefore a test of global memory. The world said 'never again' after COVID-19. The PABS debate will reveal whether that phrase meant justice or merely grief.
Equity as speed
Equity is often presented as a moral add-on to pandemic response. In reality, equity is speed. If countries trust that they will receive vaccines, diagnostics and treatments, they will report faster and cooperate more openly. If they fear exclusion, they will delay, bargain or hide. A fair system is therefore not slower; it is faster because it reduces hesitation.
This is the central lesson negotiators must absorb. Benefit-sharing is not charity after science. It is part of the surveillance system itself.
Industry's role
Pharmaceutical companies are indispensable because they hold technology, manufacturing know-how and distribution capacity. But public trust requires obligations during emergencies. Companies benefit from global pathogen sharing, public research funding and emergency procurement. In return, they should accept access commitments when products are developed from shared pandemic resources.
The debate should move away from demonising industry or surrendering to it. The correct model is partnership with enforceable public-interest conditions.
A treaty without implementation
Many international agreements fail not because the text is weak but because implementation is unfunded. Pandemic preparedness needs laboratories, regulators, supply chains, trained workers and manufacturing facilities. Legal commitments without money become diplomatic decoration.
The pandemic agreement should therefore be matched by financing mechanisms that help low- and middle-income countries build real capacity. Otherwise, the next outbreak will expose the same gaps under a new treaty name.
Final editorial line
The trust deficit between rich and poor nations is not rhetorical. It is written in delivery schedules, licensing terms and empty warehouses. The treaty will be judged not by signatures, but by who receives protection first when danger returns.
Research Sources Used
• WHO pandemic agreement Q&A: https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/pandemic-prevention--preparedness-and-response-accord
• WHO pandemic agreement topic page: https://www.who.int/health-topics/who-pandemic-agreement
• Reuters, pandemic treaty delay over PABS rules: https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/who-delays-pandemic-treaty-amid-pathogen-sharing-dispute-2026-05-01/
