Turkey middle power: Why It Matters for India
Turkey is becoming a more assertive middle power because it sits at the crossroads of conflicts, corridors and identities. It is a NATO member with deep disagreements with Western partners. It talks to Russia while selling drones to Ukraine. It wants influence in the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean. It uses geography, defence industry, diplomacy and nationalism to increase its bargaining power.
Why the issue matters now
The concept of a middle power usually describes a state that is not a superpower but has enough capacity, location and diplomacy to shape regional outcomes. Turkey fits this category unusually well. It controls access between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits. It borders Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus. It has military capacity, a large economy, an active intelligence apparatus, a strong national identity and a growing defence industry.
Turkey's assertiveness has several drivers. The first is geography. Few countries sit near so many strategic theatres at once. Ukraine and the Black Sea are to the north. Syria, Iraq and Iran are to the south and east. The Eastern Mediterranean, Libya and energy politics lie to the west and southwest. The Caucasus and Central Asia connect Turkey to Turkic identity and the Middle Corridor. Geography gives Ankara options, but it also exposes it to insecurity.
The second driver is defence industrial growth. Turkey has invested heavily in domestic defence production, especially drones, armoured vehicles, naval platforms, missiles and air defence. Turkish armed drones have been used in conflicts from Ukraine to Nagorno-Karabakh and parts of Africa. Reuters reported in 2025 that Turkish defence companies signed USD 6.5 billion worth of contracts to reinforce the country's multi-layered Steel Dome air defence system. This reflects Ankara's ambition to reduce dependence on external suppliers and become a major defence exporter.
The strategic geography
The third driver is diplomatic balancing. Turkey has tried to maintain ties with Russia while remaining in NATO. It has hosted talks, managed grain diplomacy, bought Russian systems in the past, supported Ukraine's sovereignty and kept channels open with multiple sides. This approach frustrates allies who want clearer alignment, but it gives Turkey leverage. Ankara's foreign policy often works through transactional bargaining rather than ideological consistency.
The fourth driver is domestic politics. Assertive foreign policy plays well with nationalist sentiment. It allows Turkish leaders to present the country as independent, respected and no longer subordinate to Western preferences. This domestic legitimacy dimension should not be underestimated. Foreign policy is not only about external threats; it is also about internal political narratives.
Turkey's rise as a middle power has implications for several regions. In Syria, it has shaped conflict dynamics, refugee politics and Kurdish questions. In the Caucasus, it supported Azerbaijan and gained influence after the Nagorno-Karabakh war. In Libya, it intervened militarily and diplomatically. In Africa, it has expanded embassies, airlines, construction, aid and defence exports. In Central Asia, it is using cultural and linguistic ties through Turkic platforms.
India angle
For India, Turkey is both an opportunity and a complication. The opportunity lies in trade, connectivity, tourism, technology, construction, civil aviation and some areas of strategic dialogue. Turkey's location makes it relevant to Eurasian connectivity and the Middle Corridor. Indian businesses can engage Turkey as a gateway to Europe, West Asia and Central Asia. Both countries are large, civilisational states with strong domestic markets.
The complication lies in Turkey's position on Pakistan and Kashmir. Ankara has often taken positions that India sees as unfriendly or intrusive. Turkey's close defence ties with Pakistan, including naval and military cooperation, concern Indian strategists. If Turkey's defence exports deepen Pakistan's capabilities, India will naturally treat Ankara with caution. This is why India-Turkey relations have potential but remain politically constrained.
The CEPS policy brief on Turkey describes it as one of the active middle powers navigating the erosion of the post-Cold War order, positioned between a divided West and assertive Russia and China. That captures the essence of Turkey's strategy. Ankara is not leaving NATO, but it is not content to be a passive NATO member. It wants autonomy inside alliance structures.
Counter-view and complexity
The global implications are significant. Turkey represents a wider trend: middle powers are no longer waiting for great powers to define their choices. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa and Turkey all practice forms of multi-alignment. They bargain, hedge, diversify and seek issue-based influence. This makes the international system more fluid and less predictable.
The counter-view is that Turkey's assertiveness may be limited by economic fragility. Inflation, currency pressure, external financing needs and political polarisation can constrain foreign policy ambitions. Military involvement across multiple theatres can stretch resources. Relations with the United States and Europe remain vulnerable to sanctions, defence disputes and democratic concerns. Middle-power activism can become overreach if economic foundations weaken.
What happens next
Yet Turkey has repeatedly shown that even constrained states can create leverage if they control strategic geography and maintain diplomatic flexibility. Ankara does not need to be loved by all sides. It needs to be needed by enough sides. That is the logic of Turkish middle-power strategy.
What happens next will depend on the Ukraine war, Syria's political future, NATO's evolution, energy corridors, Turkey's economic stability and domestic leadership choices. If Turkey stabilises its economy while expanding defence exports and corridor diplomacy, its influence will grow. If economic stress deepens, its assertiveness may become more reactive and risky.
India's approach should be clear-eyed. It should not ignore Turkey because of disagreements, nor should it romanticise cooperation. India should engage Turkey where interests align, push back where core interests are challenged, monitor Turkey-Pakistan defence ties, and explore economic areas that can build pragmatic ballast. A mature relationship can contain disagreement without being defined entirely by it.
A deeper reading of Turkey requires understanding that Ankara's assertiveness is not only about President Erdogan, although his leadership style has shaped it. It also reflects structural ambition within the Turkish state. Many Turkish strategists believe the country was constrained for too long by Western frameworks and should use its geography to become an autonomous centre of influence. This ambition is likely to outlast any single leader.
The Black Sea is central to Turkey's value. Through the Montreux Convention, Turkey has a special role in regulating naval passage through the Straits. During the Ukraine war, this role became strategically important. Turkey could support Ukraine, maintain ties with Russia and manage access in ways that gave it diplomatic relevance. Geography became leverage.
The Middle Corridor is another opportunity. As countries seek routes connecting China, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Turkey and Europe without relying entirely on Russia, Turkey's transit value increases. This connects Ankara to Central Asian Turkic states and European supply-chain planning. If the corridor becomes more commercially viable, Turkey's logistical importance will grow.
Defence exports give Turkey a new language of influence. Drones, naval systems, armoured vehicles and training relationships create durable ties. Defence customers often become diplomatic partners. Turkey has used this effectively in Africa, Central Asia and West Asia. India should monitor not only the volume of Turkish exports but the political relationships they create.
Turkey's ideological positioning is flexible. It can speak as a Muslim-majority power, a NATO member, a Turkic leader, a Eurasian bridge, a Black Sea actor and a Mediterranean state. This multi-identity diplomacy allows Ankara to enter many conversations. It can also create contradictions. Partners may question reliability when Turkey shifts tone across forums.
India-Turkey relations will remain constrained unless Ankara becomes more sensitive to India's core security concerns. Kashmir references and Pakistan defence cooperation create distrust in New Delhi. However, India should still maintain channels because Turkey is too strategically located to ignore. Engagement does not require strategic intimacy; it requires disciplined communication.
Economic cooperation has underused potential. Tourism, textiles, construction, engineering, pharmaceuticals, auto components, civil aviation and logistics can create practical links. Business communities can provide stability when politics becomes difficult. India should encourage commercial ties while remaining alert to security concerns.
The deeper conclusion is that Turkey's assertiveness is part of a wider age of middle powers. The world is no longer organised only by superpower blocs. Countries with location, industry, military capability and diplomatic nerve can create issue-based influence. Turkey is one of the clearest examples of that trend.
Turkey's domestic economy will remain the main constraint on its foreign policy. High inflation, currency volatility and external financing needs can limit strategic ambitions. A country can use drones and diplomacy to gain influence, but sustained power requires macroeconomic stability. Observers should therefore track Turkish economic indicators alongside military moves.
The relationship with Russia is both useful and risky for Turkey. Energy ties, tourism, trade and diplomacy give Ankara leverage, but excessive dependence can constrain choices. Turkey has tried to benefit from relations with Moscow without becoming subordinate to it. That balancing act will become harder if Russia-West confrontation deepens.
Turkey's outreach to the Turkic world has implications for Central Asia. Cultural and linguistic ties give Ankara a soft-power advantage India does not have. However, Central Asian states will avoid replacing Russian or Chinese dependence with Turkish dominance. Turkey's role will likely be influential but not hegemonic. India should watch this space because it affects Eurasian connectivity politics.
For India, one practical question is whether Turkey can be engaged through minilateral or economic platforms where political disagreements are less dominant. Business forums, tourism, civil aviation, disaster relief, cultural exchanges and academic contacts can keep the relationship functional. Strategic disagreement does not have to eliminate all cooperation.
The editorial insight is this: Turkey is becoming assertive because the world now rewards states that can connect regions, talk to rivals and produce security tools. It is not a great power, but it has learned how to behave like a power broker. For India, Turkey is a reminder that middle powers can shape outcomes far beyond their size - when geography, industry and ambition are combined.
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