The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is one of the most unusual institutions in world politics.
It brings together China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian republics and Belarus under one regional framework. It speaks the language of multipolarity, sovereignty, counter-terrorism, connectivity, economic cooperation and Eurasian stability. It represents a vast landmass, a large share of the world’s population, major energy producers, nuclear powers, ancient civilisations, emerging markets and strategic corridors connecting Asia, Europe and the Middle East.
On paper, the SCO should be one of the most powerful platforms in the world.
Yet its reality is more complicated.
The SCO has promise because Eurasia needs cooperation. Terrorism, extremism, narcotics, border instability, energy security, climate stress, migration, infrastructure gaps and trade connectivity cannot be managed by one country alone. Central Asia needs stable partnerships. India needs access to Eurasian markets. China wants continental influence. Russia wants relevance beyond the West. Iran wants diplomatic space. Smaller states want balance and development.
But the SCO also has serious limits. India and China remain strategic competitors. India and Pakistan carry unresolved hostility into the same room. Russia and China cooperate but do not have identical interests. Central Asian states welcome major-power attention but do not want domination. Iran brings its own confrontation with the West. Connectivity projects are blocked by sovereignty disputes, sanctions, poor trust and geopolitical rivalry.
This is why the SCO is important: not because it has solved Eurasia’s problems, but because it shows both the need for cooperation and the difficulty of building it.
The organisation today has ten member states, including Belarus, India, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Iran, according to the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure’s official member listing. Its official outreach page also records two observer states, Afghanistan and Mongolia, and lists 15 dialogue partners including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bahrain, Egypt, Cambodia, Qatar, Kuwait, Laos, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Sri Lanka.
That geography is impressive. But geography alone does not create strategy.
The SCO Was Born From Security Anxiety
The SCO’s origins lie in the post-Soviet Eurasian security environment.
The initial concern was not global governance or grand multipolarity. It was border stability, separatism, terrorism and regional security in Central Asia. The organisation evolved from the “Shanghai Five” process involving China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan later joined, and the SCO was formally established in 2001.
The SCO’s own official FAQ notes that the organisation initially focused on mutual intra-regional efforts to curb terrorism, separatism and extremism in Central Asia, and that its Charter was signed in 2002 and entered into force in 2003.
This history matters because it explains the SCO’s security grammar.
Unlike the European Union, the SCO was not built around liberal integration. Unlike NATO, it was not built around collective defence. Unlike ASEAN, it was not built around smaller states managing regional diversity through consensus diplomacy. The SCO emerged from the security concerns of authoritarian and post-Soviet states, combined with China’s desire for stability in Xinjiang and Russia’s desire to remain central in Eurasia.
Its key vocabulary became the “three evils”: terrorism, separatism and extremism.
This vocabulary gave members a common language. But it also created ambiguity. One state’s terrorism concern may be another state’s internal dissent issue. One state’s separatism concern may overlap with ethnic, religious or political grievances. Security cooperation can protect citizens, but it can also be used to justify state control.
That duality has followed the SCO from the beginning.
Central Asia Is the Core of the SCO
The SCO is often discussed through the lens of China, Russia and India. But its geographic heart is Central Asia.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are not peripheral members. They are central to the organisation’s purpose. Their geography connects China, Russia, Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia and Europe. Their stability affects terrorism risks, drug routes, energy corridors, migration patterns and continental trade.
The Astana Declaration of July 2024 explicitly stated that Central Asia is the core of the SCO and supported the efforts of Central Asian states to ensure peace, security and stability in their countries and the wider region.
For Central Asian states, the SCO offers several advantages.
It gives them a platform where they can engage China and Russia together. It reduces the risk of being isolated between larger powers. It allows cooperation on terrorism, border security, transport, trade and energy. It also gives them diplomatic visibility in a world where Central Asia is often ignored unless conflict or resources are involved.
But Central Asia’s position is also sensitive.
These states do not want to become dependencies of China. They do not want Russia to treat them as a post-Soviet backyard. They want Turkish, Indian, European, Gulf and other partnerships as well. Their foreign policy is increasingly multi-vector. The SCO helps them balance, but it does not remove the pressure of living between giants.
This is one of the SCO’s quiet tensions: the organisation claims equality, but its members are not equal in power.
China Sees the SCO as a Continental Platform
For China, the SCO is strategically valuable.
It stabilises China’s western neighbourhood. It provides a framework for engagement with Central Asia. It supports China’s connectivity ambitions. It gives Beijing a non-Western multilateral platform where it can present itself as a responsible regional leader. It also helps China counter narratives that the international order must be organised primarily through Western-led institutions.
The SCO fits China’s larger Eurasian vision.
Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has invested heavily in transport, energy and digital infrastructure across Eurasia. Central Asia is critical to these corridors. Rail links, pipelines, roads, logistics hubs and industrial zones all matter to China’s long-term continental strategy.
The Astana Declaration showed this clearly. It noted support by several member states for China’s Belt and Road Initiative and referred to ongoing work to connect BRI with the Eurasian Economic Union, while also discussing transport corridors, logistics centres, trade facilitation and financial mechanisms such as an SCO Development Bank and SCO Development Fund.
But China’s leadership is not universally comfortable for all members.
India is cautious about BRI because the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which India considers a violation of its sovereignty. Russia welcomes Chinese cooperation but also watches China’s growing influence in Central Asia carefully. Central Asian states want Chinese money but not excessive dependence.
So China gives the SCO energy, scale and ambition. But China’s rise also creates strategic anxiety inside the SCO.
Russia Uses the SCO to Preserve Eurasian Relevance
For Russia, the SCO has become even more important after the Ukraine war and worsening relations with the West.
Moscow uses the SCO to show that it is not isolated. It remains a major Eurasian power. It still sits at the table with China, India, Iran and Central Asian states. It can present the SCO as part of a broader multipolar order where Western dominance is declining.
This symbolism matters to Russia.
But Russia’s role has changed. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Moscow was still the dominant external power in Central Asia. Today, China’s economic influence has grown dramatically. Russia remains militarily, culturally and historically important, but China has become the larger economic force.
This creates a subtle imbalance.
Russia and China often coordinate against Western pressure, but they are not identical powers. China is rising economically; Russia is more defensive. China wants connectivity and markets; Russia wants strategic space and security influence. China’s Eurasian project is commercially expansive; Russia’s is often geopolitical and security-driven.
The SCO allows both countries to cooperate without openly confronting their differences.
That is useful. But it also means the SCO often avoids hard questions.
India’s Membership Makes the SCO More Important and More Difficult
India’s entry into the SCO changed the organisation’s character.
Before India and Pakistan became full members in 2017, the SCO was largely a China-Russia-Central Asia framework. India’s presence gave the organisation greater global legitimacy. It brought in a major democracy, a large economy, a nuclear power, a civilisational state and a country with deep interests in Central Asia.
But India also made the SCO more complicated.
India’s relationship with China is tense. The unresolved boundary question, the 2020 border crisis, Chinese support for Pakistan and India’s concerns over BRI all shape New Delhi’s approach. India’s relationship with Pakistan is openly hostile, especially on terrorism. Inside the SCO, therefore, India must work within a forum that includes both its principal continental adversary and its long-term regional rival.
This is why India’s SCO diplomacy is careful.
At the 25th SCO Summit in Tianjin in September 2025, India described its approach through three pillars: Security, Connectivity and Opportunity. Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for firm action against terrorism in all manifestations, coordinated action against terror financing and radicalisation, and no double standards in dealing with terrorism. He also highlighted Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor as connectivity projects India supports.
This captures India’s basic strategy.
India wants to use the SCO where it helps Indian interests: counter-terrorism, Central Asia access, connectivity, Afghanistan-related concerns, energy dialogue and Eurasian diplomacy. But India does not want the SCO to become a China-led platform that legitimises projects violating Indian sovereignty.
India’s participation is therefore not ideological alignment. It is strategic engagement.
Terrorism Is the SCO’s Strongest and Most Contested Agenda
The SCO’s most developed security mechanism is the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, known as RATS.
The RATS website describes its role as facilitating coordination and interaction between the competent bodies of SCO member states in countering terrorism, separatism and extremism. For India, this is one of the most useful aspects of SCO membership because terrorism remains a central security concern.
But terrorism is also where the SCO’s limits become visible.
India wants terrorism to be addressed without selectivity. It wants cross-border terrorism and state support for terrorism to be treated seriously. Pakistan, also an SCO member, rejects India’s framing. China often protects Pakistan diplomatically. This creates friction inside the organisation.
In June 2025, an SCO defence ministers’ meeting in China failed to adopt a joint statement after disagreements over terrorism language. Reuters reported that India withheld agreement because its concerns, including references linked to the April 2025 Kashmir attack, were not adequately reflected.
This episode is important because it reveals the SCO’s weakness.
The organisation claims counter-terrorism as a core objective, but its members do not always agree on what terrorism means, who supports it or how directly it should be named. When political interests intervene, consensus weakens.
A counter-terrorism platform that cannot address members’ core terrorism concerns will always face a credibility problem.
Connectivity Is the SCO’s Great Promise
Eurasia needs connectivity.
India wants access to Central Asia and beyond. Central Asia wants access to seaports and diversified trade routes. Iran wants to become a transit hub. Russia wants north-south corridors. China wants east-west corridors. Landlocked states want logistics options. Energy exporters want markets. Manufacturers want transport corridors that reduce dependence on unstable routes.
The SCO is therefore a natural platform for connectivity.
The Astana Declaration supported transport corridors, logistics centres, favourable conditions for international road transport, trade facilitation, customs cooperation, and interconnectivity across the SCO region.
But connectivity is also where politics obstructs geography.
India cannot use direct overland routes through Pakistan for trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia because India-Pakistan relations remain hostile. India supports Chabahar port in Iran and the International North-South Transport Corridor because they provide alternatives to Pakistan-controlled routes. China promotes BRI and CPEC, but India opposes CPEC because of sovereignty concerns. Sanctions on Iran and Russia complicate financing, insurance, banking and logistics. Afghanistan’s instability affects regional routes.
So the SCO talks about connectivity, but its members do not share one connectivity map.
China’s map runs through BRI.India’s map runs through Chabahar and INSTC.Russia’s map runs through Eurasian integration and north-south corridors.Central Asia wants all options but dependence on none.Pakistan wants routes that strengthen its own geostrategic relevance.Iran wants sanctions-resistant transit importance.
This is why connectivity remains both the SCO’s greatest opportunity and one of its biggest frustrations.
Afghanistan Is a Test the SCO Has Not Fully Passed
Afghanistan should be one of the SCO’s most urgent areas of cooperation.
It affects terrorism, extremism, narcotics, refugees, border security, regional connectivity and humanitarian stability. Several SCO members border Afghanistan or are directly affected by its instability. The organisation has observer and contact mechanisms linked to Afghanistan, and the SCO official outreach page notes that the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group was tasked with proposals and recommendations to support a peaceful, stable Afghan state free from terrorism and extremism.
Yet the SCO has not produced a decisive Afghanistan framework.
This is partly because members have different relationships with the Taliban, different security concerns and different levels of diplomatic recognition. Pakistan has deep historical involvement. Iran has border, refugee and sectarian concerns. Central Asian states want security and electricity-trade links. China is concerned about extremism and mineral access. Russia worries about instability spreading north. India is concerned about terrorism and wants humanitarian engagement without legitimising anti-India networks.
These overlapping interests should produce cooperation. Instead, they often produce cautious statements.
Afghanistan reveals the SCO’s core dilemma: it is surrounded by shared problems, but not always united by shared solutions.
The SCO’s Economic Agenda Remains Underdeveloped
The SCO speaks frequently about trade, finance, investment, innovation, energy, digital cooperation and development. But compared with its security symbolism, its economic integration remains limited.
The Astana Declaration referred to the SCO Economic Development Strategy to 2030, a proposed SCO New Economic Dialogue Programme, national currency settlements, a possible SCO Investment Fund, and continued consultations on an SCO Development Bank and Development Fund.
These ideas show ambition. But they also show incompletion.
The SCO is not a customs union. It is not a common market. It does not have the institutional depth of the European Union or the trade discipline of a serious free-trade bloc. Its members have different economic systems, sanctions exposure, currency risks, political priorities and external partnerships.
For example, India is not interested in a China-dominated Eurasian economic order. Russia is under heavy Western sanctions. Iran is sanctioned. Pakistan faces chronic economic stress. Central Asian economies want investment but not overdependence. China has enormous manufacturing and financial capacity but also creates trade imbalances.
Economic cooperation is possible, but deep integration is difficult.
The SCO can support dialogue, standards, transport, energy and business forums. But it is unlikely to become a fully integrated economic bloc in the near future.
Energy Cooperation Is a Natural Area of Convergence
Energy is one of the SCO’s strongest potential areas.
Russia, Iran and Kazakhstan are major energy players. Central Asia has oil, gas, uranium and hydropower potential. China and India are major energy consumers. Pakistan also has major energy needs. Eurasia’s energy geography is naturally interconnected.
The Astana Declaration approved a strategy for energy cooperation until 2030 and called for a coordinated and balanced energy transition that accounts for both producing countries and consumers of traditional fuels.
This wording is important.
The SCO’s energy politics are different from Western climate diplomacy. Many SCO members are either fossil fuel producers or developing economies that prioritise energy access and affordability. They are unlikely to accept an energy transition model that ignores national development needs.
For India, this is relevant. India wants clean energy growth, but it also wants energy security, affordable fuel, fertiliser stability and strategic autonomy in energy sourcing. SCO discussions can help India engage producers and transit states, though sanctions and geopolitics complicate implementation.
Energy cooperation may therefore become one of the SCO’s practical pillars, especially if it focuses on affordability, grid stability, critical minerals, hydrocarbons, renewables and energy transport.
The SCO Reflects Multipolarity, but Not Unity
The SCO is often described as a symbol of multipolarity.
That is true, but it must be understood carefully. Multipolarity does not mean harmony. It means power is distributed among several centres. Those centres may cooperate on some issues and compete on others.
The SCO embodies this perfectly.
China wants a larger role in global governance. Russia wants to resist Western pressure. India wants strategic autonomy and a greater voice for the Global South. Iran wants diplomatic space outside Western-led systems. Central Asian states want balance. Pakistan wants relevance and Chinese support. Belarus wants protection from isolation.
All of them can agree that Western dominance should be reduced. But they do not agree on what should replace it.
That is why the SCO is not an alliance.
It has no NATO-style collective defence clause. It does not impose one foreign policy line. Its members disagree on wars, borders, terrorism, connectivity, sanctions, trade and the role of China. It is a platform of overlapping interests, not a bloc of unified strategy.
This makes the SCO flexible. It also makes it limited.
China-India Tensions Are the Biggest Structural Constraint
The future of the SCO depends heavily on China-India relations.
If India and China remain locked in deep strategic suspicion, the SCO cannot become a truly cohesive Eurasian platform. The two countries are the largest Asian powers in the organisation. They have large economies, nuclear weapons, civilisational weight and competing regional visions.
Their border dispute, China’s partnership with Pakistan, India’s concerns over BRI, China’s Indian Ocean presence and competition for Global South leadership all affect SCO dynamics.
There have been efforts to stabilise the relationship. In 2025, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to China for the Tianjin SCO summit drew attention because it was his first China visit since the 2020 border clashes. AP reported that Modi and Xi Jinping discussed resolving border differences and improving cooperation, while India emphasised the importance of peace and tranquillity along the border.
But one summit does not remove structural distrust.
India cannot treat the SCO as a fully comfortable platform while China remains its main strategic competitor. China cannot expect India to accept a China-centred Eurasian order. This rivalry will continue to limit the SCO’s institutional depth.
Pakistan Makes Consensus Harder for India
Pakistan’s membership further complicates India’s role.
India and Pakistan rarely cooperate meaningfully in regional organisations when security issues are involved. SAARC itself became paralysed largely because of India-Pakistan tensions. The SCO offers a larger multilateral setting, but it cannot erase bilateral hostility.
For India, terrorism remains the central issue. For Pakistan, Kashmir remains central. China often aligns diplomatically with Pakistan. This creates a triangle of mistrust inside the SCO.
This does not mean India should leave the organisation. On the contrary, India’s presence prevents the SCO from becoming a China-Pakistan-Russia-Central Asia platform without Indian influence. It gives India a seat at the Eurasian table. It allows India to raise terrorism concerns in a forum where Pakistan and China are present. It also helps India maintain links with Central Asia and Russia.
But India must be realistic.
The SCO will not solve India-Pakistan problems. At best, it provides a structured room where both are present without direct bilateral engagement.
Iran’s Membership Changes the SCO’s Geopolitical Weight
Iran’s full membership adds another layer to the SCO.
It strengthens the organisation’s energy profile, expands its West Asian connection and gives Iran a major non-Western platform. For China and Russia, Iran’s presence strengthens the anti-Western optics of the SCO. For India, Iran is important because of Chabahar port and connectivity to Central Asia. For Central Asia, Iran provides access to the Persian Gulf.
But Iran’s membership also brings complications.
Western sanctions, Iran’s regional rivalries and its tensions with the United States and Israel affect the SCO’s external perception. Some members may welcome Iran strategically but avoid being pulled into its confrontations. India, for example, values relations with Iran but also has strong ties with the United States, Israel, the Gulf and Europe.
This again shows the SCO’s pattern: expansion increases weight, but also increases complexity.
Belarus Shows the SCO’s Political Direction
Belarus became the tenth full member of the SCO in July 2024, a development described in the Astana Declaration as historically significant.
This expansion is symbolically important.
Belarus is closely aligned with Russia and is heavily isolated by Western countries. Its entry reinforces the perception that the SCO is becoming a platform for states seeking non-Western diplomatic space. But this also raises questions about the organisation’s image.
If the SCO becomes increasingly identified with anti-Western solidarity, India’s comfort may reduce. India wants a multipolar world, not a rigid anti-Western bloc. It works with Russia and Iran, but also with the United States, Europe, Japan and Australia. It participates in BRICS and the Quad. Its foreign policy is multi-aligned, not camp-based.
Belarus’s entry shows the SCO’s expansionary ambition. It also shows why India must continuously shape the organisation’s agenda rather than passively accept its direction.
The Tianjin Summit Showed Ambition
The 25th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State in Tianjin in September 2025 showed the organisation’s ambition.
The SCO Secretariat stated that 24 documents were approved at the meeting, including the Tianjin Declaration, the SCO Development Strategy until 2035, a statement connected with the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and the formation of the United Nations, and several thematic statements. India’s Ministry of External Affairs also noted that the Tianjin Declaration was adopted at the conclusion of the summit and that Kyrgyzstan took over the next SCO presidency.
This indicates institutional momentum.
A development strategy until 2035 suggests that the SCO wants to move beyond annual declarations. It wants a longer-term identity. It wants to become a platform for security, connectivity, development, culture, technology, energy and global governance.
But the real test is implementation.
Documents are easy. Delivery is hard. The SCO has always been strong in declaration diplomacy. It must now prove whether it can translate strategy into projects, trust and crisis-management capacity.
The SCO’s Strength Is Dialogue Among Rivals
One should not dismiss the SCO merely because it has contradictions.
Sometimes the purpose of a regional organisation is not to create unity, but to prevent total breakdown. The SCO allows countries with serious disputes to sit together. India and China can engage in the same forum. India and Pakistan can be present in the same room. Russia and China can coordinate without formal alliance. Central Asian states can engage multiple powers at once.
This has value.
In a fragmented world, dialogue platforms matter. Even when they do not produce breakthroughs, they maintain channels. They reduce misperception. They create diplomatic habits. They allow side meetings. They give smaller states visibility. They keep regional issues on the agenda.
The SCO may not be a problem-solving machine, but it is a geopolitical pressure valve.
For Eurasia, that matters.
The SCO’s Weakness Is Lack of Trust
The SCO’s biggest weakness is not lack of agenda. It is lack of trust.
India does not fully trust China or Pakistan. Central Asian states do not want overdependence on China or Russia. Russia may cooperate with China but watches its rise. Iran may use the SCO but has its own priorities. Pakistan sees the platform through its rivalry with India. China wants leadership but faces suspicion.
Without trust, cooperation remains shallow.
This is why the SCO often produces broad language instead of binding action. It can condemn terrorism generally, but struggles when terrorism concerns point toward a member or a member’s ally. It can support connectivity generally, but cannot reconcile India’s objection to CPEC. It can discuss economic cooperation, but cannot overcome sanctions and strategic distrust. It can speak of multipolarity, but cannot define a common political project.
Trust is the missing infrastructure of Eurasian cooperation.
India Should Stay, but With Clear Eyes
India should remain active in the SCO.
Leaving the SCO would not weaken China. It would only reduce India’s Eurasian presence. India needs Central Asia. It needs Russia engagement. It needs connectivity alternatives. It needs counter-terrorism platforms. It needs influence in institutions where China is active. It needs to demonstrate that its diplomacy is not limited to Western-led or Indo-Pacific platforms.
But India should not romanticise the SCO.
It should use the organisation selectively and strategically. It should push counter-terrorism without compromise. It should promote Chabahar and INSTC. It should deepen direct relations with Central Asian states outside the SCO as well. It should resist any language that legitimises BRI projects violating Indian sovereignty. It should support practical cooperation in energy, digital economy, health, education, startups and culture.
India’s goal should be simple: use the SCO where useful, resist it where necessary, and prevent it from becoming a China-dominated Eurasian consensus.
What the SCO Can Realistically Achieve
The SCO can achieve meaningful cooperation in some areas.
It can improve counter-terrorism coordination. It can support border-management dialogue. It can help Central Asian stability. It can promote transport discussions. It can encourage energy cooperation. It can expand cultural and educational exchanges. It can provide a non-Western platform for Eurasian diplomacy. It can support national-currency discussions where feasible. It can become a forum for Global South-style demands around multipolarity and institutional reform.
But the SCO is unlikely to become a deep alliance or integrated economic union.
It has too many internal contradictions. Its members are too different. Its rivalries are too sharp. Its institutional mechanisms are not strong enough. Its consensus culture limits decisive action. Its largest members have competing visions.
This does not make the SCO useless. It makes it limited.
Understanding those limits is essential.
The Future of Eurasian Cooperation
Eurasia is too important to remain disconnected.
The continent contains major energy reserves, large populations, strategic corridors, ancient trade routes, critical minerals, food systems, conflict zones and rising markets. Its stability affects global politics. Its fragmentation affects everyone.
The SCO is one attempt to organise this vast space.
Its promise lies in geography, necessity and shared concern. Its limits lie in mistrust, rivalry and asymmetry.
That is the real story of the organisation.
It shows that the world is moving toward multipolarity, but multipolarity does not automatically produce cooperation. It shows that non-Western platforms are rising, but they too carry hierarchy and contradiction. It shows that Eurasia needs connectivity, but politics can block roads more effectively than mountains. It shows that countries can sit in the same institution while still fearing one another.
For India, the SCO is neither a threat to be abandoned nor a partnership to be celebrated uncritically. It is a platform to be used with discipline.
For Central Asia, it is a balancing mechanism.For China, it is a continental influence platform.For Russia, it is proof of Eurasian relevance.For Iran and Belarus, it is diplomatic space.For Pakistan, it is strategic visibility.For India, it is a difficult but necessary room.
The SCO reveals the promise of Eurasian cooperation because it brings together countries that must talk.
It reveals the limits of Eurasian cooperation because those same countries do not fully trust one another.
That is why the SCO matters. Not because it has already built a new order, but because it exposes how hard building any new order will be.
