The most important challenge to the Western-led global order today is not coming from one battlefield, one trade war, or one military alliance. It is coming from a slow, deliberate and widening partnership between Russia and China — two powers that do not fully trust each other, do not share the same long-term interests, and are not formal treaty allies, yet have found enough common ground to push back against American and European dominance.
For the West, this partnership looks like an authoritarian axis. For Moscow, it is a survival strategy after sanctions, isolation and war. For Beijing, it is a geopolitical lever against U.S. pressure. For the Global South, it is often presented as a demand for a “multipolar” world. For India, it is both an opportunity and a strategic warning.
The Russia-China partnership became globally visible on 4 February 2022, when Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping declared that friendship between their two states had “no limits” and that there were no “forbidden” areas of cooperation. The timing was crucial: it came just weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and at a moment when Moscow was demanding that NATO stop expanding while Beijing was facing growing Western pressure over Taiwan, technology, trade and the Indo-Pacific.
Since then, the relationship has hardened. It has moved from diplomatic symbolism to energy dependence, trade substitution, military coordination, alternative payment systems, and joint criticism of U.S.-led institutions. In May 2026, Xi and Putin again used a high-level meeting in Beijing to call for a “more just and reasonable” global governance system and expressed opposition to “hegemonism and unilateralism.”
That phrase — “hegemonism” — is the key to understanding the partnership. Russia and China may disagree on many issues, but they agree on one central proposition: the post-Cold War order gave the United States and its allies too much power.
The Partnership Is Not an Alliance, but It Is More Than Symbolism
Calling Russia and China formal allies would be inaccurate. There is no NATO-style mutual defence pact between them. China has not openly joined Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russia has not surrendered its entire foreign policy to Beijing. Historical mistrust, competition in Central Asia, demographic anxieties in Russia’s Far East, and asymmetry in economic power still limit the relationship.
But dismissing the partnership as symbolic would be equally wrong.
The relationship has become a functional anti-Western alignment. It works not because Moscow and Beijing love each other, but because both need each other against Western pressure. Russia needs Chinese markets, technology, currency channels and diplomatic cover. China needs Russia as a strategic partner that distracts the West, supplies energy, supports Beijing’s global narratives, and helps weaken U.S.-centric institutions.
This is what makes the partnership powerful. It does not need to become a formal alliance to reshape the world. It only needs to create enough friction, enough alternatives and enough uncertainty to dilute Western dominance.
The Western-led order was built after World War II and strengthened after the Cold War through American military alliances, the dollar-dominated financial system, Western-controlled technology networks, global institutions, sanctions power and liberal norms around democracy and human rights. Russia and China challenge this order in different ways. Russia attacks its security structure directly, especially in Europe. China challenges it economically, technologically and institutionally.
Together, they create a two-front problem for the West.
Ukraine Turned Russia Toward China
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine did not create the Russia-China partnership, but it accelerated it dramatically. Western sanctions cut Russia off from many European markets, financial channels and technology sources. Moscow had to redirect trade, energy exports and payment systems toward non-Western partners. China became the most important of them.
China has become an economic lifeline for Russia since 2022, buying Russian oil, coal and gas while selling cars, electronics, machinery and industrial goods into a market vacated by Western companies. Even though China-Russia trade fell in 2025 for the first time in five years, it still stood at about $228.1 billion, showing how large the relationship has become after the Ukraine war shock.
Energy is the strongest pillar. Russia’s Gazprom supplies gas to China through the Power of Siberia pipeline, a 3,000-km route built under a 30-year deal. In 2025, gas exports through that route rose to 38.8 billion cubic metres, exceeding the pipeline’s planned annual capacity.
This matters because energy trade is never only commercial. For Russia, it replaces lost European demand. For China, it diversifies supplies away from vulnerable maritime routes that can be monitored or blocked by U.S. naval power. For the West, it reduces the effectiveness of sanctions by giving Moscow a large alternative buyer.
Still, the relationship has limits. Russia wants China to buy more gas, fund more projects and move faster on major pipeline expansion. China bargains hard. It knows Russia has fewer options. That asymmetry is one of the most important hidden weaknesses in the partnership.
Russia Is Becoming the Junior Partner
The Russia-China relationship is often presented as a partnership of equals. In reality, the balance is shifting sharply in China’s favour.
Russia remains a nuclear superpower, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a major energy exporter and a military actor capable of disrupting European security. But economically, it is far smaller than China. Sanctions have increased its dependence on Beijing, especially in technology, consumer goods, machinery and finance.
A European Union Institute for Security Studies analysis found that Russia’s dependence on Chinese goods surged after 2022, with Chinese products rising from 23% of Russia’s total imports in 2021 to 57% in 2024. By contrast, Russia’s importance to China’s overall imports changed only marginally, giving Beijing far more flexibility than Moscow.
This asymmetry is central. China can recalibrate its Russia policy if costs rise. Russia cannot easily replace China. That makes Moscow strategically useful to Beijing but also increasingly dependent on it.
For India, this is a serious concern. New Delhi has traditionally relied on Russia as a defence partner and diplomatic balancer. But a Russia increasingly dependent on China may be less able to act independently in moments of India-China tension. India does not want Moscow to become an extension of Beijing’s strategic orbit.
Military Coordination Is Growing
The Russia-China partnership is also becoming more visible in the military domain. Their military cooperation is not yet a unified command structure, but it has expanded through joint exercises, naval patrols, air operations, defence dialogues and strategic signalling.
According to MERICS, Russia and China have conducted 97 joint military exercises since 2003, with activity increasing after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The pattern has also shifted toward naval drills and patrols, including activity in sensitive maritime zones.
This is important because maritime coordination directly affects the Indo-Pacific, Arctic routes, the Western Pacific and potentially the Indian Ocean. Russia’s military pressure stretches NATO in Europe. China’s military rise pressures the United States and its allies in Asia. Together, they complicate Western military planning.
SIPRI’s 2026 data shows how militarised the global environment has become. World military expenditure reached $2.887 trillion in 2025, with the United States, China and Russia together accounting for 51% of global military spending. China spent an estimated $336 billion, while Russia spent about $190 billion despite the economic strain of war.
This does not mean Russia and China can defeat the West militarily. The United States and its alliance network remain formidable. But the partnership forces Washington to plan for simultaneous crises: Ukraine or the Baltic region in Europe, Taiwan or the South China Sea in Asia, cyber conflict across networks, and energy shocks across global markets.
That is the strategic value of the Russia-China axis: not overwhelming the West in one theatre, but stretching it across many.
The Challenge Is Also Institutional
Russia and China are not only cooperating bilaterally. They are also using multilateral platforms to question Western dominance.
BRICS is one example. The grouping has expanded beyond Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE became full members from January 2024, while Indonesia joined in January 2025; several countries also joined as partner countries in 2025.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is another platform. In 2025, Xi Jinping used the SCO summit in Tianjin to push a new global security and economic order that prioritised the Global South and challenged U.S.-dominated institutions. The summit included leaders such as Putin and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, giving the optics a strong geopolitical message.
These forums are not as cohesive as NATO, the EU or the G7. BRICS contains democracies and autocracies, energy exporters and importers, China’s competitors and China’s partners. The SCO includes India and Pakistan, two rivals with deep security disputes. But their importance lies in narrative power. They allow Russia and China to argue that the West no longer speaks for the world.
This is why the Russia-China partnership resonates in parts of Asia, Africa, Latin America and West Asia. Many countries do not want to live under American dominance, but they also do not want to become Chinese or Russian satellites. They want bargaining power. Moscow and Beijing exploit this desire by presenting themselves as champions of multipolarity.
The Dollar, Sanctions and the Search for Alternatives
The Western-led order rests heavily on financial power. The U.S. dollar, Western banks, SWIFT access, sanctions regimes and export controls give Washington enormous influence. Russia’s experience after 2022 showed both the strength and the limits of that power.
Sanctions hurt Russia, but they also accelerated its search for alternatives. China’s yuan became more important in Russian trade after the Ukraine invasion. MERICS notes that yuan settlements in Russia’s international trade rose sharply from less than 2% before the war to nearly 40% in January 2024, before later estimates became less reliable due to reduced Russian disclosures and sanctions-related complexity.
This does not mean the yuan is about to replace the dollar globally. It is not. China’s capital controls, lack of full convertibility, trust issues and the depth of U.S. financial markets still protect the dollar’s central position. But the political message is clear: Russia and China are building partial escape routes from Western financial pressure.
Even partial alternatives matter. They reduce the fear of sanctions for some countries. They create new payment channels. They encourage trade in national currencies. They make the global financial system more fragmented.
For Western policymakers, this is a dilemma. Sanctions remain powerful, but overuse can incentivise targeted countries to build parallel systems. Russia and China are trying to turn that defensive reaction into a geopolitical project.
Why the West Is Worried
The West is worried because Russia and China attack different pillars of Western power at the same time.
Russia challenges the European security order. Its war in Ukraine has forced NATO to expand, rearm and rethink deterrence. China challenges Western economic and technological dominance through industrial policy, supply chains, critical minerals, AI, semiconductors, electric vehicles, infrastructure finance and naval expansion.
Together, they create a narrative that the West is hypocritical, declining and no longer entitled to set global rules. This message has an audience because many non-Western countries have their own grievances against Western interventionism, IMF conditionalities, colonial history, vaccine inequality, climate injustice and trade protectionism.
The danger for the West is not that every country will join Russia and China. Most will not. The danger is that enough countries will hedge, abstain, bypass sanctions, join alternative forums and resist Western pressure. That would make the world harder for Washington and Brussels to organise.
The India Angle: Opportunity, Risk and Strategic Autonomy
For India, the Russia-China partnership is deeply complicated.
India has strong defence, energy and diplomatic ties with Russia. At the same time, China is India’s principal long-term strategic challenge. India also works closely with the United States, Japan and Australia through the Quad, while remaining active in BRICS and the SCO. This makes India one of the few major powers sitting across almost every table in the emerging world order.
At the 2025 SCO summit in Tianjin, Modi and Putin publicly emphasised the durability of India-Russia ties, with Modi saying that India and Russia had stood “side by side even in difficult situations.” Reuters also noted that China and India were the biggest buyers of Russian crude oil at the time.
This balancing is not accidental. India does not want a U.S.-dominated unipolar order. It also does not want a China-dominated Asian order. It wants multipolarity — but not one where China becomes the strongest pole in Asia.
That is why the Russia-China partnership creates both space and risk for India.
The opportunity is that a more multipolar world gives India greater bargaining power. New Delhi can engage the West, Russia, the Gulf, ASEAN, Africa and the Global South without formally joining any bloc. It can buy energy where it sees national interest, build defence partnerships with multiple sides, and present itself as an independent voice.
The risk is that Russia’s dependence on China reduces India’s room for manoeuvre. If Moscow becomes too reliant on Beijing, India’s old assumption — that Russia can act as a balancing partner — becomes weaker. India may still buy Russian energy and defence equipment, but it will increasingly need to indigenise military capacity, diversify suppliers and deepen partnerships with countries that share concerns about China.
In simple terms, India can use multipolarity, but it cannot be naïve about who benefits most from it.
The Counter-View: The Partnership Has Limits
The Russia-China partnership is powerful, but it should not be exaggerated into a seamless alliance.
China has not openly supplied Russia with the kind of direct military support that would invite maximum Western retaliation. Beijing remains deeply connected to Western markets, technology ecosystems and export demand. It does not want Russia’s war to destroy its own economic priorities.
Russia, meanwhile, is uncomfortable with becoming a junior partner. It has its own ambitions in Central Asia, the Arctic and the defence market. China’s rise in sectors where Russia once had influence, including arms and infrastructure, creates quiet tensions.
The May 2026 Xi-Putin meeting showed both closeness and limits. The two leaders criticised the United States and promised cooperation across many areas, but they still failed to finalise a major gas deal, reflecting unresolved commercial and strategic bargaining beneath the public warmth.
This is the paradox: the partnership is strong enough to challenge the West, but not strong enough to become a perfectly unified bloc.
That makes it more flexible — and in some ways more dangerous. A formal alliance has clear rules. A flexible alignment can expand, contract, deny responsibility and cooperate selectively.
What Happens Next
The Russia-China partnership will likely deepen in four areas.
First, energy cooperation will continue because Russia needs buyers and China wants diversified supply. Second, military signalling will grow, especially through naval exercises and patrols. Third, financial experimentation will continue through local currencies, alternative payment channels and sanctions-resistant trade. Fourth, Russia and China will use BRICS, SCO and UN forums to argue for a more multipolar order.
But the partnership will also face pressure. Russia’s economic dependence will increase. China will avoid steps that endanger its larger economic interests. Western sanctions will keep targeting dual-use goods, finance and energy. India, Turkey, the Gulf states and Central Asian countries will continue hedging rather than fully aligning.
The future world order will therefore not be a simple Cold War 2.0. It will be messier: overlapping blocs, transactional partnerships, issue-based alignments, economic coercion, technological walls and constant diplomatic hedging.
Conclusion: A New Order Is Being Negotiated, Not Announced
The Russia-China partnership challenges the Western-led order because it attacks the assumption that the West alone can define legitimacy, security, finance and global governance.
But it does not yet offer a stable alternative. Russia brings disruption. China brings scale. Together, they bring pressure. What they do not bring is trust, universal appeal or a clear model that most countries want to follow.
For India, the lesson is clear. The coming world will reward countries that can think independently, build internal capacity, diversify partnerships and avoid emotional bloc politics. India cannot outsource its security to Russia, its technology future to the West, or its Asian strategy to slogans of multipolarity.
The Russia-China partnership is not merely a diplomatic friendship. It is a structural signal that the age of easy Western dominance is over. But the age replacing it is not yet settled.
That unsettled space is where India must operate — carefully, confidently and without illusion.
Next article in sequence: #52 — The New Cold War Is Being Fought Through Trade, Tech and Territory.